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in fief by the obstinate member of the comital family John of Namur and Bruges' most important seaport after Damme had become inaccessible to high tonnage ships. A two-day sack was necessary in 1323 to make the town abide by the Bruges privileges granted earlier that year, which, apart from subjecting it to the staple obligations, denied its citizens the right to produce cloth, to engage in money changing and to use a large weight. Sluys was forbidden to erect fortifications and guildsmen were expected to follow the statutes of the Bruges guilds. 7 These constraints did not prevent the outport from challenging Bruges' commercial primacy. In 1358 Count Louis of Male had to reconfirm the staple privilege and order his officers to respect it. 8 In 1367 he reprimanded the Sluyzenaars for conducting brokerage illegally but allowed them to buy wood for personal use. 9 Some thirty years and numerous quarrels later Sluys obtained the right to store wood, pitch and tar in order to repair the ships in its harbour. Its promise not to resell these commodities was never kept.
10
In the fifteenth century Sluys was often supported in its claims by Ghent, Ypres and the Liberty of Bruges, the rural district surrounding the city, whom, together with Bruges, made up the representative institution of the Four Members of Flanders. 11 Keen on reducing their counterpart's economic power, they were able to convince Duke Philip the Good to withdraw the staple restrictions on a wide range of goods in 1419. Only after Bruges had taken the matter to the Parliament of Paris was the exemption limited to merchandise produced in Flanders, except cloth, and the condition was added that nothing could be sold to foreigners.
12
In 1436, discontent about the Sluyzenaars' persistent violations of the staple privileges, together with the ducal reluctance to stop them, served as the main casus belli touching off the Bruges Revolt against Philip the Good. 13 After he had crushed the uprising in 1438 and had punished the rebellious Brugeois by, among other measures, temporarily transferring the staple to Sluys, the Duke aimed to settle the matter with a final judgment in Hesdin in 1441.
He considerably extended the range of commodities that could be unloaded at the Zwin mouth, now including exotic fruits and animals and fresh fish. Bruges, on the other hand, was to install two officers in its outport to watch over the observance of its staple privileges. A permanent commission was established to settle conflicts concerning the staple.
14 In spite of these settlements, disputes continued. In 1477, Bruges and the other major Flemish cities took advantage of Mary of Burgundy's precarious position during the troublesome succession of Charles the Bold by obtaining far-reaching concessions, including a confirmation of the staple privilege and the submission of the Zwin towns. 15 In 1487, the city again requested and was granted the preservation of their staple rights by Archduke
Maximilian of Austria and his son Philip the Fair. 16 Constitutional fiction had been overtaken by economic reality though. The Flemish Revolt, which had ravaged the county between 1477 and 1492 and which had also seriously damaged Sluys, struck the fatal blow upon Bruges' position as a hub for international trade, already on the wane for decades. In 1488, the Bruges staple officer could only watch the merchant fleets sailing by the Zwin. 17 During the 1490s, the foreign merchant communities which, for 200 years, had been the alpha and omega of the city's commercial fortune, left for Antwerp, never to return.
18
That the extent of market rights in Bruges' immediate hinterland gave rise to such heated debates throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries should hardly surprise. The organisation of commercial markets did far more than simply bringing buyers and sellers together, certainly if market rights were supported by staple regulations. It facilitated princely rulers, urban authorities and private individuals to impose taxes and tolls on the trade flows estuary, merchants were charged a droit de congé or oorlof, followed by the passaigegeld, spellegeld, wazegeld, leenknechtgeld, zettegeld and a tax on the loading of ballast, as well as the toll in the port of Damme. The revenues from these impositions disappeared into the coffers of the Dukes of Burgundy. Upon arrival traders were expected to pay the Bruges Toll, originally a princely contribution which had been alienated to and was collected by the noble Van Luxemburg family.
20
The concentration of trade in one and the same place also served the interests of those who made their living by providing commercial services. In Bruges, foreign merchants were expected to hire native brokers whenever they wanted to trade with non-locals and had to pay brokerage fees for the work they provided. The brokers worked closely together with the hostellers, who, as the owners of the taverns and inns where most temporary visitors gathered to stay, gain information and strike business deals, controlled the space where a great deal of Bruges' international trade ignited. 21 For both groups, who at the time of Bruges' emergence as a world market at the end of the thirteenth century had left active trade abroad behind themselves, the staple system constituted their life insurance. Finally, only allowing commercial exchange to take place within the city made it easier for both urban authorities and corporate bodies to regulate it. In Bruges, most retail trade was restricted to the members of the craft guilds, who closely looked after their privileges. 22 The commercial and financial elites of brokers and hostellers, together with the representatives of specific craft guilds, were the ones who, for most of the late medieval period, manned the aldermen's benches in the Bruges city hall, 23 and defined the city's policy with regard to the staple privileges. As it was in the interest of actors to keep their unregulated activities hidden and they do not appear in most economic sources, it was necessary to resort to the records of the sanctions for informality in order to do so. The accounts of the water bailiff, the legal officer exercising ducal authority and jurisdiction in the harbour of Sluys, contain the details of numerous people, both buyers and sellers, who evaded the staple rules or the payment of the congé or oorlof tax. Had they committed only small infringements or could they plead extenuating circumstances, they might have got away with a financial arrangement or 'composition'. 41 In Sententiën, the registers of civil justice, and the city's cartularies. From 1450 onwards, the fines they imposed, two thirds of which fell to the Duke and one third to the city, have been recorded in the bailiff accounts as well. 42 Pieced together, these sources have allowed us to reconstruct the commercial circuit in Bruges' surroundings that was not mentioned in the
Libelle of Englyshe Polycye. The first section of the article will deal with those who frequented this market from within the county of Flanders, as well as their motivations. A second part will consider the informal traders who came from further afield. A final section addresses the strategies used by both groups to avoid formal commercial exchange.
Numbers and backgrounds of the infringers
The accounts of the water bailiff of Sluys have been preserved from 1400 until 1411 and from 1450 until 1479. They contain 245 cases in which people who had acted against the staple regulations or had not paid the droit de congé were allowed to make a 'composition'. One hundred and twenty eight of these, or 11.6 per annum, occurred during the first eleven years of the fifteenth century. Bearing in mind that no information is available on the offenders brought before the Bruges aldermen in this period, the total number of infringements must have been significantly higher.
Between 1450 and 1479, another 117 'compositions' were agreed, giving an average of only four a year. 43 Although Bruges may have lost some of its commercial allure from the 1460s onwards, 44 this was not necessarily caused by a decline of economic activity in the Zwin Estuary. When we take into consideration the nature of the facts, the sharp drop in the number of congé evasions (from 8.3 to 2.4 a year) may also have been due to the many exemptions which were granted on this tax in the second half of the century, 45 as well as to a less consistent policy by the ducal officers. 46 The more gradual decline in the number of staple 'compositions' (from 2.8 to 1.7 a year) may imply a smaller number of crimes committed because restrictions were softened following the Hesdin ordinance, or, again, a change in the water bailiff's behaviour, by arresting fewer malefactors or, on the contrary, referring more of them to the Bruges bench of aldermen. The bailiff accounts, the Civiele Sententiën and the city's cartularies give 53 cases judged by the aldermen between 1450 and 1479, meaning that from the average 3.5 crimes committed against the staple a year, 1.7 were considered serious enough to go to court. This brings the total number of staple and congé infringements in this period up to 170.
Flemish offenders
From 1400 until 1411, at least 25.9 percent of the infringers came from within the county of them to take over a large part of the domestic market, despite the resistance of urban and princely authorities, who wanted to maintain good relations with the Hanseatic League. 52 In theory, cured herring could only be sold in the fishing towns themselves or on the staple market of Damme. In reality, many Flemish fishermen, as well as the Hollanders and the Zeelanders, who had also begun to cure herring at sea, avoided the extra transport costs, the imposition of taxes, the expensive services of brokers and the covetous eyes of civil servants 53 by bringing part of their fish to the black market in Sluys, buying highly-finished goods or shipping equipment in exchange. In the course of the fifteenth century, a concentration of fishing activities in the larger centres, such as Nieuwpoort or Ostend, occurred at the expense of the smaller ports. 54 This might explain why, between 1450 and 1479, only Lombardsijde is still mentioned in the bailiff accounts and the total share of the herring ports in the number of Flemish staple infringements nosedives from 12.1 to 5.6 percent. Nieuwpoort and Ostend completely took over the regular markets, the black market being the only resource left for the small towns that had managed to survive.
While their social position was recorded less consistently in the second period, the offenders were qualified as 'poor' in 53.1 percent of the Flemish cases and 68.4 percent of the cases where the origins were unknown during the first period, many of them burdened, so the accounts say, by the costs of supporting a family and heavy rents. 55 These were the people for whom the additional costs inherent to the staple system were not of marginal importance, as they were for the wealthy merchants and bankers in Bruges, but actually made a difference.
Travelling down the Zwin, paying for transport and taxes and complying to all regulatory requirements would have dramatically increased the price of the small amounts of goods they were interested in buying or selling. For them, trading outside the staple, branded as a crime undermining urban privileges by the authorities defining the range of staple commodities in the Bruges city hall, was a matter of survival. 56 The prevalence of these people, excluded from formal exchange by the implications of market regulation, among the Flemish offenders strongly supports the Legalist explanation of informal activities in Sluys.
Of course, the question arises as to which extent the qualifications given in the sources were a true reflection of the smugglers' social conditions. First of all, we must bear in mind that the term 'poor' did not necessarily cover the same social and economic categories during the fifteenth century as it does today. An analysis of 'poor' delinquents in the Bruges sheriff accounts between 1385 and 1550 identifies them as low wage workers, often without permanent employment. 57 Even so, offenders of the staple rules could have claimed a 'povre estat' which they were not entitled to in order to avoid a costly lawsuit or been allowed one by the water bailiff, for whom 'compositions' left more room to make a profit. 58 Jacob
Plouchman, portrayed in the water bailiff accounts as a 'simple man responsible for his wife and six little children', in reality owned three houses with annexes in the heart of Bruges.
59
Lending credence to the Voluntarist interpretation of informal trade, bypassing the staple is likely to have been a matter of choice for him, made after an assessment of the costs and benefits of formal activities. Most of those qualified as 'poor' do not appear in other sources of the period, however, suggesting their social status was rather low. Being labelled 'poor' did not provide a free ticket to a 'composition' either and some 'poor' offenders were referred to the bench of aldermen as well. 60 At the same time, the water bailiff's activities were closely scrutinised by the Bruges representatives, in whose interests it was that their city's privileges 56 The difficulties of the economically less fortunate to participate in the regular commercial circuit were also experienced by the Castillian traveller Pero Tafur who, when visiting Bruges in the 1430s, wrote that 'without doubt the goddess of luxury has great power there, but it is not a place for poor men who will be badly received'. 69 As we do not have any information that links their male partners to formal economic activities, it is hard to develop this point further in a way that supports the Structuralist view on informality. Some individual cases, 70 and the fact that only one of the women caught was summoned before the Bruges aldermen between 1412 and 1470 indicate that women may also have been used to carry out their partners' plans or bore the burden for their husbands' actions because they were more successful in obtaining advantageous arrangements from the authorities in case of arrest. 71 Even more revealing is that all but one of the female Flemings were Sluyzenaars. Their disproportionately high involvement in a lowend job whose most distinguishing characteristic was the absence of rules and guild control emphasizes the particularly straitened economic circumstances endured by the Zwin port's women due to the staple restrictions, something also attested in literary sources.
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Foreign offenders
In the first period 57.5 percent of the infringers, and at least 49.4 percent in the second period did not have Flemish origins. To a certain extent, the share of each of the foreign groups in the number of offences reflects the changing fortunes they experienced on the medieval world market that Bruges was. In some respects, however, the bailiff accounts, the Civiele Sententiën and the cartularies paint a different picture of Bruges' commercial landscape than the one commonly presented by most other sources. On the one hand, they reveal that some, most notably the Lucchese and, to a lesser extent, the Florentines, could perfectly orchestrate international trade and banking without participating in informal exchange at the Zwin entrance. On the other hand, they abound with staple and congé offences committed in Sluys by those servicing the international merchant communities but barred from, and thus invisible in, the centre of commercial exchange itself. Mariners and shipping crews supplying the goods from all parts of Europe and the lower-level staff of the established merchant colonies added the cosmopolitan flavour to that distinctive mix of local fishermen, craftspeople and economic outcasts which had more in common with the social composition of other European port towns than that within the Bruges' own walls. 73 The bailiff accounts, the Civiele Sententiën and the cartularies thus show us a segment of the city's economic activity that is absent in nearly all other accounts.
In the period 1400-1411, the Hollanders committed 16.5 percent and the Zeelanders 7 percent of the staple offences. These high numbers may be explained by the crucial role both groups played in the international wine trade. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, carrier-traders from Holland and Zeeland largely controlled the transport of wine from Poitou and Gascony ships. 81 Nearly absent in Bruges, the massive presence of Bretons in the Zwin Estuary, which is also attested by other sources, 82 led to a spectacular rise in their numbers in the accounts of the water bailiff: while only 2.4 percent of the staple infringers came from Brittany between 1400 and 1411, they even outnumber the Flemings with 11.6 percent between 1450 and 1479. 83 Apart from a little canvas, bacon and Galician iron, the 'Pety Bretayns', as they were called by the author of the Libelle, 84 sold dozens of barrels of wine in Sluys. Notarial acts drawn up before their departure from Bordeaux bear witness to the risks they incurred by doing so. In
November 1475, several Bordelais merchants entrusted Gabriel Prat from Conquet with the shipment of 108 barrels of wine to Flanders. Within 21 days of his return, the Breton would be paid the equivalent of £86 lb. 5s. par. for his work. 85 Some months later, he was fined £13
4s. par., or almost one sixth of his remuneration, for having sold wine in breach of the staple. 86 If Prat would have chosen freely to be involved in informal trade, as the Voluntarist view dictates, it is a choice he would not be likely to make again. It is more probable, however, that the strong presence of shipmen from Brittany, Holland and Zeeland and a minority of other French seamen, almost exclusively from the Atlantic coast, and responsible for 5.2 percent of the offenders in the second period, 87 should be considered from a Legalist perspective. People from these regions are hardly ever represented in the sources documenting formal trade in Bruges. Only very occasionally did they make use of its institutions, they did not have a permanent community in the city and their contacts with more established merchants were few and superficial. 88 Lacking both economic and social capital, the most accessible way for them to share in the burgeoning market that they were servicing was an informal one.
Unlike 104 The acts of piracy discussed in the Genoese case also resulted in the complete absence of Catalans after 1450 105 and the temporary disappearance of Castilians from 1456 to 1460. 106 Even so, the total Castilian share in the number of offenses against the staple rose from 1.6 percent during the first period to 3.5 percent between 1450 and 1479.
Although the Castilians primarily imported wine and Basque or Galician iron to Sluys, this increase must be related to the boom of Castilian merino wool on the Bruges market. Holland, from importing cloth to the Baltic and to sideline internal rivals less prominent in Flanders such as Cologne, the leading Hanseatic cities, Lübeck up front, always backed down. 116 Still, the Ventegut, the commodities they were allowed to sell freely, left the Oosterlingen, as their merchants were called, with more possibilities for conducting trade in Sluys legitimately than their counterparts. 117 Even though this resulted in them not being fined and recorded in the sources, the goods they provided were often sold on illegitimately by others. 118 This suggests that loosening the regulation of formal trade for only one group of traders would not automatically reduce overall informal activities, on the contrary.
As it is the essence of informal trade that it went unrecorded in the official statistics, it is hard, if not impossible to quantify its extent in Sluys. No sources other than the water bailiff accounts and, in case of legal proceedings, the Bruges registers of civil justice and cartularies, inform us on the illicit business in the port town. Still, it seems likely that the infringements sanctioned by the ducal officers were only the thin end of the wedge. Responsible for the enforcement of ducal authority on the water of the Zwin mouth and on the quays of the Sluys harbour, the water bailiff covered a jurisdiction that was far more extensive than that of any of his urban colleagues in Flanders. Within this area, the detection of staple and congé offences was only one of his many tasks, responsible for no more than eighteen percent of his average revenues both between 1400 and 1411 and 1450 and 1479. 119 The water bailiff had to make sure that law and order were respected in the harbour. Additionally, he dealt with any criminal activity that had taken place on the ships during their journey to Sluys. He authorized the arrival and the departure of all vessels in the port and claimed the shipwrecks washed up on the Zwin shores for the duke.
120
Whereas, in the case of the congé, the receipts provided upon payment could still be checked, the only option to discover staple infringements was to catch perpetrators in the act of making an illicit transaction. Even though the water bailiff could rely on a clerk and several sergeants and was able to hire the services of shipmasters to go on the water, it must be clear that complete coverage was an illusion in a place where, in 1457, over 110 ships had moored and an estimated 1,200 traders from outside the town were flocking together. 121 All of these considerations are also based on the assumption that it was in the officers' interests to track down staple offences, which, as will be shown further, was not always the case. Laurence le Moor, a Sluys local, probably judged the situation quite accurately in 1406. Stopped for selling barrels of ashes, he made the excuse that 'several others in the past had done it without having been made to account by anyone, so if they had taken something it would never have been known by the said water bailiff nor by those supposed to look after the rights of our lord and the said city'. 122 Le Moor considered the chances of being caught that low that he tried again with pieces of bacon the following year. 123 The low probability of detection must have encouraged those for whom informal activities were no necessity to trade against the staple and make a handsome profit anyway.
That the enforcement of the staple rules cannot have been that watertight is finally suggested by the fact that, despite the very stringent restrictions they imposed, Sluys only continued to grow. In 1469, on the eve of the havoc wreaked by the Flemish Revolt of 1477-1492, Sluys had over 9,700 inhabitants and ranked as the fourth city in the county. 124 Illicit trade might have been a reality for only part of them, yet it should be understood that this was not a place that willingly acquiesced in the economic holdup committed by the Bruges commercial elites.
Ignorance, powerful friends and criminal networks or how to evade the staple rules
The records of the cases made by the water bailiff or the aldermen allow us to reconstruct various strategies used by the infringers either to mislead the authorities or, in case of arrest, to arouse their sympathy. Although it is impossible to determine to which extent the explanations given by the accused were sincere, the repetition of some procedures, several of which were characteristic to certain groups, suggest that these served as an excuse to cover up more malicious intentions. One of the more rudimentary and most frequently used tactics, certainly by foreigners, was to pretend that they were not aware of the staple system, or some of its aspects. 125 The staple privileges were extremely complex and were subject to constant change. More than once, Bruges had been accused by the other Members of Flanders or by Sluys of deliberately keeping the regulations vague and interpreting them to its own advantage. 126 The bailiff accounts show that this complexity cut both ways and was abused by the black marketeers as well, often to no avail. That Luis Bembo would not have known he had to pay congé on his bundle of silk after fifteen years of regular commercial activities in the county must have raised even the most gullible officer's eyebrows. 127 Somewhat more convincing was to argue that the staple commodities, most commonly victuals, raw materials or small quantities of high value-added products, had been bought for personal use or for that of a relative, and were not in any case for resale. 128 Both arguments sufficed for the water bailiff to allow the infringers to get away with a 'composition'.
Another option was to put the blame on assistants, 129 other merchants, 130 hostellers 131 or even the ducal officers. 132 However, most of these excuses were not accepted without further investigation. In 1450, the Genoese Nicolao della Costa and Georges de Sauvignon appeared in court because some goods imported into Sluys on their ship had been unloaded and transported to Zeeland. After the accused had claimed that the vessel had been emptied on the initiative of Melchior Gentile, the captain of the carrack, an inquiry was set up by Jacques
Reingot, the Bruges representative in the Zwin port. He was able to prove that the ship used for carrying the commodities abroad had been sent to Sluys by della Costa and Sauvignon themselves, who were fined a heavy £200 par. 133 A subtle way in which the rules could be evaded was to bring to the staple or the congé only part of the freight. The Scotsman Robert Fitzthomas was penalised in 1403 for having paid taxes for 15 ells of cloth while he had imported 24. 134 Even more inventiveness was involved in the fraud with portage goods, the limited amount of commodities foreign seamen were allowed to bring along and to sell freely after registering them with the water bailiff. 135 Swindlers presented merchandise as portage while it was not, 136 offered portage goods without registration 137 or registered their stock against the names of others because they themselves were not entitled to sell portage commodities. 138 The Venetians in particular were experts in adapting the portage rules to their own needs. In 1446, after Bruges had tolerated their infringements for years, the water bailiff and the city's staple representative thought they had gone far enough and sued the Venetian merchant guild for large-scale violation of the portage arrangements. No solution was reached, as the Venetian consul was able to convince the aldermen that he and his colleague merchants were in no way responsible for the objectionable behaviour of the galley crews in Sluys. 139 In 1479
the Bruges authorities even decided to farm the office of the water bailiff's clerk, charged with the registration of portage goods, themselves, outraged as they were about the liberal interpretation of the portage concept.
140
Although most offenders did not belong to influential economic or political networks, some of them were able to avoid costly fines by calling on the aid of powerful friends and relatives.
Most enlightening with respect to the staple debate is the use of hostellers, as it was in their interests that staple privileges were faithfully respected, at least if they were active in Bruges.
Throughout the fifteenth century, the Bruges craft guilds repeatedly denounced activities and investments by Bruges citizens in Sluys. 141 Could their implicit allegations of economic collaboration have been provoked by double-dealing hostellers? 142 The bailiff accounts, the cartularies and the Civiele Sententiën contain several cases in which innkeepers obtained advantageous 'compositions' for their smuggler guests, but unfortunately do not record the hostels' locations. 143 Others intervening in the offenders' favour were their hometown bailiff 144 or city council. 145 Particularly Ghent attached much importance to the legal protection of its citizens. 146 Some offenders managed to get a more advantageous settlement thanks to bastard members of the Flemish nobility. 147 The most impressive example of intervention occurred in 1404 on behalf of Robert de Wisque from Aire-sur-la-Lys, whose fine was remitted on the order of the duchess of Burgundy.
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Following a less rigid distribution of commercial space than the places where the bulk of retail in Bruges occurred, 149 commercial exchange in Sluys burgeoned in the periphery of urban jurisdiction. The physical landscape of the Zwin region, a network of numerous hidden and less-hidden creeks shaped during centuries of floods and land reclamations 150 and difficult to monitor for anyone who wanted to exercise control, also provided the ideal environment for informal trading. 151 The most decisive stimulus to break the staple rules must have been the proximity of buyers and sellers, facilitating more direct contacts between merchants from various foreign nations on the one hand, and between foreigners and local people on the other than the heavily institutionalised and brokered trade conducted in Bruges.
Sometimes these encounters gave rise to specific black marketeering networks, in which those 
